Quote:
Originally Posted by hud 91gt
From your understanding, it sounds like the manual trim was still operational, just not successful in correcting the situation. I haven’t actually read the whole report yet, but “confirmed that the manual trim was not working” makes me believe it was innopriative. There is obviously a huge difference between the two.
For those who don’t quite understand.
1) the manual trim still works, but the aircraft is in such a state it cannot be recovered quickly enough. This could have been remedied by quicker action of the cutout switches, stopping the erratic trim operation earlier on, hoping the aircraft is in a decent state.
2) the manual trim is no longer operative. The aircraft lost that control input completely.
Big difference. If you look at the data analysis of the “trim indiciation”, there is a huge flat spot where it is stated the manual trim is not working. You would think, even a little turn of the manual trim would be indicated. It also does not state the cutoff switches were returned to normal, but the data shows electric manual and the MCAS were used after. Not a lot of info in the report.
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It's still a bit gray. From what I saw/read the use of the manual trim was ineffective and they pointed to the aircraft's speed and heavy pilot input on the controls as limiting the ability of the manual trim, so they turned MCAS back on in hopes that it would give more authority to their trim inputs in order to recover. Didn't specifically say 'not operational'. Obviously with MCAS having a single point of failure flaw in its design it just made the situation worse and put them in to a steeper dive. It alluded to Scenario 1 but until ALL data is released the exact chain of events is still speculative.